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1. INTRODUCTION 
Randomized trials are experiments in which in which we test the comparative 
efficacy of two different treatments measuring their effects on two groups of people. 
Each intervention is administered to a group of participants, chosen at random; the 
effects are then measured and compared, testing the statistical significance of the 
difference. The design of the experiment has been used in medicine for more than six 
decades now in order to test the safety and efficacy of an innovative therapy as 
compared to a given standard (or a placebo). Field experiments in the social sciences 
apply this experimental design to test policy interventions aimed at a given goal. The 
assessment of public policy programs through large-scale field experiments is already 
several decades old (the 1968 New Jersey negative income tax experiment is considered 
a pioneering example). Around 200 randomized field trials were run in the United 
States between 1960 and 1999, with more or less convincing results. In the last decade, 
there has been an explosion of interest in field experiments, mainly among development 
economists. Several programs for improving health or education, different microfinance 
and governance schemes have been tested in a number of developing countries. Many 
field experimentalists in economics expect their studies to test tools to fight poverty at 
least with the same degree of reliability than randomized clinical trials test drugs in 
medicine.  
I want to discuss here the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) that 
grounds causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences1. This 
assumption states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential 
outcome depends only upon whether or not s/he gets the treatment. In other words, the 
potential outcomes that would arise if a subject were affected by the treatment of other 
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 The NIA is often known as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). I follow here 
Gerber and Green’s terminology. 
subjects are declared negligible. Hence, the causal interpretation of the treatment effects 
is not affected by the overall pattern of actual or assigned treatments generated by 
randomization (Gerber and Green 2012, pp. 43-44).  
The NIA is quite plausible in the context of medical trials, where the therapy 
received by a patient should not disturb the effect of the alternative treatment: if I am 
taking pill A, there is no physical mechanism by which it can have an effect on your 
intake of pill B. This interference can only take place through the expectations of the 
patients about each treatment: if I think that the experimental treatment is better than the 
standard alternative and I believe I am receiving this latter, these expectations may 
impinge on the outcome2. There is wide evidence about such placebo effects and in 
order to prevent them, clinical trials are double blinded, if the therapy allows it: the 
treatments are masked so that participants remain ignorant of which on they are 
receiving. In other words, the masking of treatments constitutes the methodological 
warrant of the NIA. We still know little about the effect of the participants’ expectations 
in field experiments in the social sciences. Drawing on the knowledge accumulated in 
medical trials, on the one hand, and in laboratory experiments in economics, in this 
paper I want to examine to what extent blinding provides a warrant of the NIA in field 
trials. In the rest of this introductory section let me motivate my claim more precisely.  
In a minimal definition, a double blind trial requires participants, investigators 
and outcome assessors to be unaware of the patient’s assigned treatment throughout the 
conduct of the trial (Fergusson et al. 2004, p. 1)3. There is evidence about medical trials 
showing that blinded patients may report symptoms differently from unblinded patients; 
they also have different thresholds for leaving a trial or seeking additional treatments 
outside the research protocol4. In order to control the patients’ expectations about 
treatment, those in the control group receive a placebo when no effective treatment is 
available. Depending on the type of intervention under study, placebos may be 
presented as, e.g., capsules, sham devices or any other form simulating the 
administration of the experimental treatment. A participant is considered blinded if the 
allocation and the treatment are properly concealed, at least at the beginning of the trial 
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 We still lack a well-articulated theory about the psychological mechanisms involved in the placebo 
effect, so we use the folk-psychological term of expectations to account for it (see, e.g., Evans 2004). 
3
 For a discussion of the concept, see Howick 2011, pp. 66-68. 
4
 See, e.g., Schulz et al. 1995, 1996, 2002 and Gluud 2006. 
(Schulz et al. 2002): the allocation should be concealed in order to avoid differences in 
enrollment or early withdrawals (selection bias); treatment is concealed in order to 
prevent biases originating in the interpretation of the clinical outcome (ascertainment 
bias) and subsequent withdrawals.  
When entering a clinical trial, the participants should sign an informed consent 
form in which they learn about the expected effects of the experimental treatment and 
about the possibility of receiving a placebo. Following Colagiuri (2010), we may say 
that this information gives rise to expectations of two types: about the effects of the 
experimental treatment, on the one hand, and about the effects of the perceived 
treatment, on the other. We know what may happen if we get the experimental 
treatment, but we do not know if we are getting it. Depending on our guesses on the 
actually assigned treatment, the “physical” and the “imaginary” effects will appear in 
various combinations in each arm of the trial: e.g., some patients may think that they are 
getting a placebo when in fact they are receiving the true intervention, etc. The aim of a 
randomized allocation of concealed treatments is to distribute evenly these expectations 
across the arms of the trial in order to prevent them from having an effect on the 
outcome. 
In this paper, I am going to present and defend the following claims. First, if the 
participants are not indifferent regarding treatments, we need to implement a blinding 
device in every trial in order to ground the NIA. But we cannot take its efficacy for 
granted: we need to test that the blinding actually controlled for the expectations of the 
participants and no malign unmasking spoiled the NIA. Precisely because this test is 
necessary, we can only blind the participants up to a certain point: we cannot deceive 
them. There is evidence showing that if they suspect they are being deceived, they will 
deviate from the trial protocol, flawing the outcome. 
In section 2, I will present a crucial distinction for my case. The participants 
have two types of expectations that trialists should control for. They have expectations 
about the outcome of an experiment (e.g., the treatment they may receive): blinding 
controls for them in order to sustain the NIA. But the participants also have expectations 
about the experimental procedure: they may care about being randomized or blinded. 
Expectations of this latter type give rise to the so-called experimenter demand effects 
(sometimes, less precisely, Hawthorne effects): the participants are second-guessing the 
intentions of the experimenter in a way that alters their behavior. They do not act as 
they would outside the experimental setting, compromising the validity of its results. In 
sections 3 and 4, I will discuss how these procedural expectations set limits on the 
amount of blinding we should impose on our experimental subjects: we need to test the 
success of blinding (in order to check the NIA) and we can only do this with 
questionnaires, so we need our participants to answer sincerely. If they suspect they are 
being deceived, they may lie. Hence, field trialists should resist the temptation to 
deceive their patients, as they sometimes suggest. 
2. THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN A TRIAL 
The participants in comparative trials usually have expectations about the 
outcome of the experiment and it may be dramatically different depending on the 
treatment they are receiving. The case of drug trials in developing countries illustrates 
this point. These are countries in which there are fewer opportunities for the majority of 
the population to access decent treatments, even for standard conditions. Clinical trials 
provide a unique occasion for them to gain access to new drugs, even in the testing 
stage, but the participants find themselves in a position of inferiority regarding the 
pharmaceutical companies when it comes to negotiate the details of the trial. A case in 
point that brought international attention to the problem was a 1997 study of maternal-
to-child HIV transmission conducted in Africa: the contrasting drug was a placebo 
instead of the best available treatment, as it should have been according the developed 
world bioethical standards (Petryna 2009, pp. 33-37). But most patients did not expect 
any care whatsoever outside the trial and they were willing to participate in the trial and 
take their chances with a placebo. 
But if their expectations about the treatment outcome are higher, they may not 
accept placebos so easily. The early anti-AIDS AZT trials conducted in the United 
States provide a good instance: as Epstein 1996 shows, many of the potential 
participants had been involved in the gay liberation movement of the 1970s and they 
used this network to organize themselves and make their claims about the conduct of 
trials. Since they did not believe in the hypothesized equivalence between AZT and 
placebo, many trial participants resorted to all sort of tricks to make sure they had the 
former (exchanging pills, taking them to labs to test whether they had an active 
principle, etc.). In sum, the patients distorted the research protocol to a point that made 
the experiment unfeasible. 
Even if the two treatments are in principle equivalent, in economic field trials, 
people may behave differently if they realize in which group they are depending on their 
taste for each treatment: we can easily imagine a situation in which the participants act 
in a way that secures either the success or failure of a treatment, depending on their own 
interests. If we want to increase the number of kids that go to school in a deprived area, 
is it better to pay a compensatory sum to parents to give them direct incentives to send 
them there or shall we pay for the kids’ meals at school? Even if the latter option may 
turn out to be more effective, parents may be too tempted by the prospect of receiving 
cash to acknowledge it. After all, we are testing social policies about which people may 
have opposite views not very sensitive to empirical evidence. 
If the outcome of a trial, be it a drug or a social policy, is important enough for 
the participants we cannot expect them to comply with a randomized protocol, unless 
they believe the treatments in both arms are equivalent. In this respect, blinding is a 
means of protocol enforcement: if the participants do not know the treatment they are 
receiving, their only chance to get their preferred outcome will be to remain in the trial 
till its completion. However, the participants in a trial may not only have expectations 
about the outcome. They may also care about the experimental procedure itself: the way 
the treatment are administered according to the trial protocol.  
This point was first raised regarding randomization by James Heckman (1992) in 
a seminal paper about causal inference in field experiments. His argument focused on 
the non-comparative evaluation of social policy programs, where randomization simply 
decided who would join them (without allocating the rest to a control group). In this 
setting, we hypothesize that the outcome Y of participating in a program is causally 
determined by a given variable X, while participation in the program is itself determined 
by an umbrella variable Z. There is a set of values of Z, for which the subject will take 
part in the experiment. For instance, if we are evaluating a training program and, say, 
basic literacy is the outcome attained by the participants, we may presume it to be 
determined by their previous education, age, etc. Participation in the program may 
depend on certain values of income, employment, etc., all captured by Z. Heckman 
suggests we should distinguish between regular participation in a program and 
participation in the program in an experimental regime, where participation is 
randomized. Hence, we need to assume that:  
a) Randomization does not influence participation 
b) If it does, the effect is the same for all the potential participants. 
c) Or, if different, it does not influence their decision to take part in the program.  
Heckman’s main objection is that randomization tends to eliminate risk-averse 
persons: if a potential participant wants to achieve the program’s outcome but is only 
willing to take part in the test if she gets the treatment with probability 1, we will lose 
her for the experiment. This is only acceptable if risk aversion is an irrelevant trait for 
the outcome under investigation. However, even if irrelevant, it compels experimenters 
to deal with bigger pools of potential participants in order to meet the desired sample 
size, so the exclusion of risk-averse subjects does not disrupt recruitment. But bigger 
pools may affect in turn the quality of the experiment, if it implies higher costs. One 
way or another, argues Heckman, randomization is not neutral regarding the results of 
the experiment. Hence, the NIA does not hold. 
In this view, the expectations of risk-averse persons about the experimental 
procedure (randomization) can generate a self-selection bias in the data: part of the 
potential population will not take part in the experiment if they become aware of 
randomization. According to Banerjee and Duflo (2009) and other advocates of field 
trials, we should blind participants about randomization in order to control their 
expectations about the procedure of the experiment. For instance, we can disguise 
randomization as a lottery by which the scarce resources of the program are allocated in 
order to make it more attractive to the participants. Or we may hide it straight away. As 
Banerjee and Duflo observe, “ethics committees typically grant an exemption from full 
disclosure until the end-line survey is completed, at least when the fact of being studied 
in the control group does not present any risk to the subject” (2009, p. 20). Participants 
in the experimental group will not know how they got involved and those in the control 
group may never know they have been excluded. If these latter are in different villages, 
as it often happens in trials run in developing countries, they may not get to know about 
the experimental treatment.  
Summing up, the participants in a comparative trial may have expectations of 
two types, about the experimental outcome and about the experimental procedure. 
Expectations about the outcome may challenge the NIA and we should control for them 
with blinding devices. Expectations about the procedure may also bias the results (e.g., 
via self-selection effects, as we just saw) and blinding may also control for them, 
disguising or hiding the procedure. But, as we are going to see in the next section, there 
are procedural expectations about being blinded that constrain our use of masking 
devices. 
 3. BLINDING AND DECEPTION IN ECONOMIC LABORATORIES 
Let me know discuss procedural expectations in laboratory experiments in 
economics. Unlike in field experiments, in the laboratory the experimenter provides the 
environment in which the participants make their decisions. The laboratory is endowed 
with desks in which there usually is either pen and paper or computers that participants 
should use. They receive a set of instructions for the decision task. Depending on their 
performance, they will receive a monetary payment and the experimenter must ensure a 
direct and salient connection between decisions and payoff in order to make the results 
interpretable (or internally valid).  
However, making such decision involves a task construal job for the 
participants: they do not have an algorithm to make them, just a set of instructions that 
they should interpret in the context of the experiment. And they will try to find 
additional information that may help them. Part of it may come from the social 
interactions in the laboratory and this may interfere with the goals of the experiment. 
The experimenter is in a position of authority regarding the participants, due to their 
procedural expectations: he knows what they should do. If the participants perceive 
anything the experimenter does as a cue prompting them to act in a certain manner, they 
may feel obliged to comply, generating an experimenter’s demand effect (EDE). They 
would not behave as they would have done spontaneously, which is what the tested 
model aims at capturing. Let me quote one of the illustrations suggested by Zizzo 
(2010, p. 81): 
Chou et al. (2009) did a set of best guessing games experiments, with a standard rule 
that the winner would be the person guessing closest to 3/4 of the average guess by two 
players. One of their manipulations was to introduce a strong hint on how to play the 
game, by writing down (in bold characters, as a separate paragraph and with a figure on 
the side to stress the point) “Notice how simple this is: the lower number will always 
win”. Chou et al. found that subjects largely followed this advice. In another 
manipulation they had what they label a “battle protocol” in which “your job is to 
choose how high to locate your troop on the hill, from 0 feet high to 100 feet high” and 
“you win the battle if your chosen location is higher than your opponent’s”. Subjects 
largely followed ‘the job’ they were given. Chou et al. interpret the findings as showing 
that the instructions enabled subjects to have a better game theoretical understanding of 
the guessing game.  
There is another possible interpretation: there was a social EDE at work and 
subjects simply did what they were either strongly hinted or told to do. As such, Chou et 
al. may not be actually measuring the levels of reasoning of the subjects, which, given 
the abstract nature of the game, is arguably the main reason of interest of guessing 
games as such.  
For the analysis of these interactions, Zizzo (2010) argues that we should 
consider the connection between the participants’ expectations about the experiment’s 
goals (and their subsequent actions) and the experimenter’s true goals. He distinguishes 
three possible situations 
(1) Uncorrelated expected and true objectives 
(2) Negatively correlated expected and true objectives 
(3) Positively correlated expected and true objectives 
In the first case, the true experimental objectives are obscure to the subjects, so 
their actions cannot engage in potentially confounding actions. In the remaining two 
cases, the participants’ decisions can bias the experiment. An obvious solution would be 
to blind them regarding the true goals of the test, just as Duflo and her coauthors 
suggested about field experiments. After all, deceiving participants about the 
experiment they are in is an old tradition in fields such as social psychology. But 
deception has been traditionally proscribed in economic experiments.  
In my view, the best rationale for this prohibition is grounded in an empirical 
analysis of the procedural expectation about blinding conducted by Ortmann and 
Hertwig (2002): deception may generate biases. After a systematic review of the 
literature on the various effects of deception in psychological experiments, they 
conclude that if participants suspect that they are being deceived, their behavior 
changes. In experiments on suspicion, the participants may receive tip-offs about the 
true purpose of the experiment, they may be made aware of experimental manipulation 
or they may be explicitly informed that they are being deceived. In all these cases, 
suspicion alters their performance in a wide range of variables experimentally 
investigated in social psychology. If they are simply told that some kind of deception 
might happen (or they are not told at all), there is no difference in their behavior 
compared to the control group. Moreover, direct experience of deception often affects 
the performance of participants in future experiments –though there is no evidence that 
indirect experience (e.g., word of mouth) has the same effect. For instance, participants 
are concerned about being observed and judged, and they usually seek positive 
evaluations and avoid negative ones.  
Blinding the true objectives of an experiment through deception can generate 
biases if the participants discover it. Zizzo (2010) recommends instead various forms of 
non-deceptive obfuscation, such as minimizing the interaction of experimenters and 
participants, using context-free language in the instructions or experimental designs that 
disguise the true goals of the experiment: e.g., arranging the experiment in various 
sessions so that participants forget about crucial details, incorporating “filler tasks”, etc. 
In other words, we can only blind procedures partially. Full blinding would imply 
deception: lying to the participants about the true goals of the experiment from the 
informed consent form onwards.  
The disclosure of the goals of the experiment creates a strategic interaction 
between the experimenter and the participants: in its simplest form, the experimenter 
can choose between being honest to the participants (about the settings and purpose of 
the experiments) or deceive them; the participants can choose between trusting the 
experimenter or question his claims (Ortmann and Hertwig 2001). It seems that we are 
sensitive enough to deception to the point of becoming suspicious once it happens, even 
if we do not have much to lose. This is a source of expectations about the experimental 
procedures that we need to control for, at the cost of partial disclosure. We need to trust 
the evidence showing that participants are less suspicious once they have been warned 
about the possibility of, at least, obfuscation and hope that this latter works.  
In sum, we need blinding in order to enforce the experimental protocol and 
warrant the NIA. But the participants have procedural expectations about blinding: they 
do not like it if it goes as far as deception. Hence, blinding can only be partial and we 
therefore need to test whether it actually works. As we are going to see in the following 
section, drawing again on the experience accumulated in medical trials, the nature of 
these tests provides an additional argument for the necessity of partial blinding. 
4. BLINDING AND DECEPTION IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
Blinding was not uniformly used in clinical trials until the 1950s, but became a 
standard debiasing procedure when the FDA adopted the double blinded RCTs with 
placebo controls as their benchmark for testing the safety and efficacy of a compound. 
Placebos perform a double function in these trials: on the one hand, they conceal the 
lack of treatment; on the other hand, they provide a baseline to determine the true 
efficacy of the experimental treatment compared to the natural rate of remission of the 
disease, including here the effects generated by the expectation of being treated. Of 
course, this baseline presupposes that blinding is effective and patients do not discover 
the actual treatment they receive. However, this has been an untested assumption until 
recently. As a matter of fact, the blinding procedures (and their success) are often 
imperfectly reported, despite the CONSORT recommendation in this respect. In view of 
my arguments in the previous section, I concur with this latter: we need to test the 
success of blinding in our experiments. 
In order to test the degree of success of blinding, A. Hróbjartsson and coauthors 
(2007) investigated a sample of trials where blinding had been reported in comparison 
with another sample where there was no report –contacting the authors for further 
information. Let me quote their results: 
Thirty-one out of 1599 trials (2%) reported tests for the success of blinding. Test 
methods varied, and reporting was generally incomplete. Blinding was considered 
successful in 14 out of the 31 trials (45%) and unclear in 10 (32%). Of the seven trials 
(23%) reporting unsuccessful blinding the risk of a biased trial result was either not 
addressed or was discounted in six cases. We received 130 questionnaires from trial 
authors (65%) of which 15 (12%) informed that they had conducted, but not published, 
tests. (Hróbjartsson et al. 2007, p. 654) 
The method used most frequently to test blinding was to ask patients to guess in 
which group they were. It was considered unsuccessful if their guess was better than 
random. Interestingly, according to Hróbjartsson et al. (2007, p. 657), in six out of the 
seven cases in which blinding was considered unsuccessful the authors either skipped or 
discounted the possibility of bias. The methodological quality of the trials where 
blinding was tested was similar to the trials in the sample. 
There is no general agreement though about how to assess the success of 
blinding. Usually, participants are asked about their treatment guesses and their answers 
coded with different scales: e.g., they may choose between “placebo” and “active 
treatment” (and sometimes “don’t know”) or between a more nuanced qualification of 
their belief (such as “strongly believe the treatment is placebo”, “somewhat believe…”, 
etc.). There are two main approaches to the analysis of these answers. On the one hand, 
some focus on the correctness of the patients’ guesses, usually through blinding indexes 
measuring their degree of disagreement with the treatment actually received. These 
indexes usually assign weights to each type of response. Correct guesses may point out 
to unsuccessful blinding, but we need to interpret then the meaning of incorrect guesses 
and “don’t know” answers. These latter, for instance, are considered the most 
supportive of success in the James’ blinding index (Kolahi et al. 2009). However, we 
need to assume here that the patients are sincere and their responses do not constitute an 
experimenter’s demand effect: they answer what they believe they are expected to. This 
is sometimes checked by requesting from the participants who give this answer a second 
“forced” guess between active treatment and placebo (Bang et al. 2004, p. 155).  
As I mentioned before, unblinding may be caused by a true effect, so we may 
wonder at what point in the trial we should test for success. The indexes mentioned 
above usually rely on the participants’ guesses at the end of the trial. But what if the 
proportion of correct guesses is the same at the beginning and the end of the trial: 
assuming that the allocation was properly concealed, shall we take it as a sign of 
unsuccessful blinding? The second approach to the problem focuses instead on the 
connection between the patterns of belief about treatment in each group throughout the 
trial and the clinical outcome under analysis. For instance, Rees et al. (2005) distinguish 
between consistent, switching and undecided beliefs, depending on how stable the 
guesses are at various points throughout the trials. In this second approach, the success 
of blinding is not measured by the correction of the guesses, but instead by their impact 
on the result: if patients with a similar pattern of belief (e.g., those who consistently 
believe themselves to be receiving a placebo) have a differential outcome compared to 
patients with other patterns, blinding will not be working properly. 
In these two approaches, we find different conceptions of the placebo effect. In 
the former, having a correct guess seems necessary for our expectations to impinge on 
the trial outcome. In the latter, the placebo effect occurs when certain patterns of belief 
have a differential effect on the outcome. Whereas in the former, blinding aims at 
preventing the formation of correct guesses, in the latter blinding should block any 
connection between belief and outcome. If we knew the psychological/physiological 
mechanisms by which the expectations impinge on the treatment outcome we could try 
to block it directly. But we lack such knowledge, we may say we are blinding blindly, 
e.g., Rees et al (2005) found a lower rate of disease among those who consistently 
believed (correctly or incorrectly) that they were in the placebo group. Given that the 
active intervention was a water treatment unit installed at the kitchen sink, it seems 
difficult to gather why believing that you do not have it installed led to lower rate of 
gastrointestinal infections. 
As I said in the introduction, we have very little understanding of the causal 
effects of our expectations from treatments on the actual outcome, except that there 
seems to be some. Perhaps this is why the consequences of unsuccessful blinding are 
not often discussed. For instance, if the patients in the control group come to believe 
that they are receiving a placebo, the trial will compare a treated group with an 
untreated group in terms of the participants’ expectations. Since we know little about 
the mechanisms by which these latter operate, the damage of unsuccessful blinding to 
the comparison is difficult to quantify5. 
  
 
Table 1 A balanced placebo design (Colagiuri 2010) 
 
A potential solution would be to use an experimental design which factored out 
the net effects of expectation. But this would require deception, as the balanced placebo 
design shows. As illustrated in table 1 above, half of the patients in the active treatment 
will be told they will get a placebo (group B) and half of the patients getting a placebo 
will be told the opposite (group C). There is no blinding for the rest of participants: they 
know what they get, be it an active treatment or a placebo. 
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 As a matter of fact, it might be difficult to quantify even when blinding is successful if the placebo and 
the treatment responses are not additive: in this case, the placebo response in both arms may mask the true 
effect of the active treatment in one of them. 
The virtue of this design is that we can factor out the effects of patients’ 
expectation on the active treatment. But, of course, it assumes that patients will not 
suspect they are being deceived and exhibit a consistent pattern of belief about 
treatment throughout the trial. As we saw in the previous section, the more we use this 
design, the more we risk that suspicion spills over to future experiments. If patients 
suspect doctors to be lying to them, it will become increasingly complicated to test the 
success of blinding in this design through the patients’ responses: e.g., a patient in group 
B might well think “I am told I have no treatment, but I feel better: has the doctor lied to 
me? If he did, does he expect me to tell him he’s a liar?” 
If patients take part in more than one trial, suspicion will inevitably spill over. In 
the experiments reviewed by Ortmann and Hertwig, indirect evidence of deception may 
not alter the participants’ behavior. But, as I mentioned already, in these experiments 
there usually were not significant expectations about the outcome, as happens in clinical 
trials. With higher stakes in the outcome, patients may be more sensitive to deception: 
e.g., a meta-analysis has gathered evidence that when patients are randomized to their 
preferred treatment, the effect size is bigger than in patients who were indifferent to 
treatment assignment (Preference Collaborative Review Group 2008). Until we do not 
gather firm evidence on the effects of patients suspecting deception, we should apply 
the cautions against lying to patients in clinical trials that Ortmann and Hertwig 
recommended to experimental economics.  
5.  SHOULD WE ACCEPT THE NIA AT FACE VALUE IN FIELD TRIALS? 
Let me summarize my argument so far: if the treatment outcome provides a good 
enough incentive for participants, they may violate the experimental protocol 
unblinding themselves, putting the NIA in question. The most efficient way to avoid it 
is to strengthen our blinding procedure, but only to a point where no suspicions of 
deception arise in the participants. If this latter happens, it may hinder any test for the 
success of blinding based on their responses. Hence, blinding is bound to be partial and 
it may well fail. However, this does not imply that we can dispense with blinding, since 
it is only warrant of the NIA: we need to test its success. 
The experience accumulated so far in clinical trials shows that possible breaches 
in the NIA does not seem to diminish the external validity of their results (Teira & 
Reiss, forthcoming). However, the situation may be radically different in field trials, 
because most interventions hinge directly on the expectations of the participants: they 
are performing tasks according to a set of incentives laid out by the experimenter. This 
is why the NIA requires a strong enforcement in a field trial for the conclusions to be 
credible. The participants’ expectations should not be correlated in a systematic manner 
with the outcome of the experiment, just as in laboratory experiments, and we should 
not use deception if we are to test the success of our masking procedures. The 
development of effective blinding schemes is a serious challenge for the social trialist. 
But if they want a solid causal interpretation of their results, grounded on the NIA, there 
is no other alternative.  
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